INSTRUÇÕES DA AVALIAÇÃO

1. Esta prova possui 15 (quinze) questões objetivas, podendo ser de múltipla escolha com 5 (cinco) alternativas (A,B,C,D,E,) ou com 2 alternativas (verdadeiro ou falso).

2. A duração da prova será de 120 minutos.

3. Todas as questões possuem o mesmo peso.

4. Não será permitido utilizar materiais de consulta como dicionários. Candidatos que utilizarem material de consulta serão eliminados.

5. Uma vez que o candidato finalize a prova, não será possível retornar ao ambiente de prova.

6. É possível avançar e retornar nas páginas da prova. Não há limite de tempo estabelecido por cada questão.
II. Explanatory Arguments

If we begin with the idea that a narrative, unlike a chronicle, is a conjunction of explanatory statements like "The Moslem seizure of the Mediterranean Sea caused the breakdown of [what Pirenne calls] the Mediterranean Commonwealth of Europe," then one of the first problems to which we must address ourselves is the nature of the connection asserted in these explanatory statements. However, as I have already suggested and as we shall see in detail later on, this is not the only philosophical problem connected with narration. For if we think of a narrative as presenting a chain of linked statements about, say, a given country, then there are two fundamental problems that we may raise about that chain; and then we may ask about the relationship between this chain as a whole and the thing of which it purports to be a history. The first inquiry is primarily an inquiry into the nature of statements made in answer to the question "Why did what happen happen?" and the second is primarily an inquiry into the nature of statements made in answer to the question "What happened?" We shall launch the first inquiry in this chapter, where we shall concentrate on the connection between the singular explanatory statements in a narrative and generalizations or laws. It will be convenient to begin by considering what is sometimes called the covering law, or regularity, theory of historical explanation. On this view an explanation of a war, a revolution, or an economic depression is similar in structure to an explanation of a fire. We may explain a particular fire, it is maintained, by deducing the statement that the fire has taken place from the statement that a spark has fallen into a wastebasket of dry paper surrounded by oxygen and from the law that whenever a spark falls into such a wastebasket under such conditions, a fire will take place. Some philosophers who accept this view contend that not only the truth of a singular explanatory statement in ordinary language, like "The lit cigarette caused the fire" or "The bent rail caused the breakdown of the Mediterranean Commonwealth in Europe", is dependent on the truth of a law. Ever since Hume, such a theory has exerted a powerful hold on philosophers, even on those who recognize and emphasize the limits of historical speculation. The idea that we can intuitively see causal connections between historical events without appealing to inductively established laws, or that causes have unanalyzable powers to bring about their effects, has seemed indefensible to philosophers of an empirical turn of mind, and they have therefore been led to the view that causal statements are either disguised statements of laws or are in some way dependent upon them for their truth. Even though historians in their explanatory statements refer to particular events like the Civil War and the conflict between Northern and Southern economic interests,
philosophers under the influence of Hume and Mill have maintained that such explanatory statements turn out upon analysis to imply, involve, presuppose, or depend on general laws. Often one gets the impression from some advocates of the covering law, or regularity, theory of explanation that an explanation of an individual historical event is neither more nor less than a deductive argument of the kind previously illustrated in the case of the fire. It follows, as least on what I shall call the standard version of the covering law theory, that the singular causal statement made by the historian, or even that made by the man who says that the fire was caused by a spark falling into the wastebasket, is not, strictly speaking, an explanation. On such a view it may be an incomplete explanation or an explanation-sketch; it may be elliptical for, or an inferior version of, a deductive argument containing laws and so-called statements of initial conditions and premises, but it is not a full-fledged explanation.

Now in my opinion this standard way is not the best way to state the logical connection between generalizations and what are usually called historical explanations, and a considerable part of my argument in a later part of this study will be devoted to showing why and to presenting an alternative view of that connection. But since the standard version of the regularity theory has been staunchly advocated by many distinguished philosophers and also unfairly attacked, I want to present the standard version in this chapter and also to consider some ineffectual arguments that have been leveled against it. Then, in the next chapter, I shall show how the covering law theory should be modified so as to meet certain other objections without abandoning its basic philosophical aim. After presenting the standard version of the covering law, or regularity theory, I shall consider three complaints about it: first, that any effort to analyze historical explanations as explanatory deduction arguments must lead to the formulation of generalizations that are also complex as to apply only to single instances, and hence to the formulation of generalizations that do not state lawful regularities; second, that the generalizations which the analyst cites in his explanatory deductive arguments must lead to the formulation of generalizations that are also complex as to apply only to single instances, and hence to the formulation of generalizations that do not state lawful regularities; and third, that the historian may explain the behavior of one individual on a given occasion without depending on knowledge of how other similar individuals behave.


**Questão 1 - 2,0 pontos**

In the phrase "and then we may ask about the relationship between this chain as a whole and the thing of which it purports to be a history", the word 'purports' could be replaced, without change in the meaning, with any of the words below, EXCEPT:

a) aspires  
b) means  
c) claims  
d) rushes  
e) looks

**Questão 2 - 2,0 pontos**

The sentence (1st paragraph) "For if we think of a narrative as presenting a chain of linked statements about, say, a given country, then there are two fundamental problems that we may raise about that chain." is suitably rewritten, without any noticeable change in meaning in the alternative:

a) Unless a narrative is conceived to present a chain of linked statements about a given country, we should take two fundamental problems about that chain into account.

✓b) Two pivotal problems could arise if we are to conceive a narrative as a sequence of connected statements about a country, for instance.

c) Provided we conceive a narrative as a chain of linked statements about, a country, for example, to issues may compromise the chain.

d) Once we can't help assuming that a narrative is said to be a chain of linked statements about a country, there are two fundamental problems we may raise about that chain.

e) A narrative is a chain of linked statements about a country. Therefore, we may raise two fundamental problems about that chain.

**Questão 3 - 2,0 pontos**

It can be inferred from the 2nd paragraph what is written in the alternative:

a) The author argues that historical explanation is dependent on the truth of inductively established laws.

✓b) Philosophers since Hume have asserted that we can intuitively see causal connections between historical events without necessarily appealing to general laws.

c) The author believes that an explanation of a war, a revolution, or an economic depression is similar in structure to an explanation of a fire.

✓d) Empiricist philosophers tend to conceive causal statements referring to particular events as disguised statements of general laws.

e) There is controversy between an empiricist approach based on Hume's theories and a more intuitive approach based on the ideas of Mill.
After reading the text, which five key words would you choose as the best to mark it for further research?

a) Narrative, explanation, Hume, speculation, Law

b) Narrative, explanation, covering laws, deduction, philosophy of History

c) Narrative, philosophy of History, sparks, empiricism, explanation

d) Explanation, causes, empiricism, Civil War, speculative Philosophy, Logics

e) Logics, explanation, narrative, Hume, Mill, cause

Which of the alternatives below best paraphrases the text?

a) If we conceive a narrative as a chain of linked statements, we may face the need to explain the nature of those links, which will lead us to a discussion on the nature of explanation and its dependence, or not, on inductively established general laws. Historical explanation is a field of controversy concerning the notion of covering laws or regularities. Empiricist philosophers tend to conceive historical explanations as grounded on general laws that may simply be disguised in historians' mention to singular events as causes of others, whereas there is room for arguing that we may intuitively see causal connections between historical causes without relying on a general rule.

b) Whenever we intend to provide a narrative purporting to be a historical explanation, we should answer two questions: "Why did what happen happen?" and "What happened?". These two guiding questions should enable us to conceive a narrative as a chain of linked statements ultimately linked to a covering, law, a regularity, as have been traditionally proposed by philosophers such as Hume and Mill.

c) Advocating the notion of a covering law, or that an explanation of an individual historical event is neither more nor less than a deductive argument which links particular events to general rules is no suitable for historical knowledge for it reduces narrative to causal chains which tend to make historical events something repetitive, which they are not.

d) While explaining a war, a revolution or an economic depression, the historian is always seeking for covering laws. That means answering the question "Why did what happened happen?" and finding an causal explanation which can be applied to other historical event and circumstances, ultimately leading to a theory of explanation of a kind of events. That makes historical knowledge closer to scientific knowledge, as advocated by empiricist philosopher such as Hume.

e) Narratives usually link statements within a relationship of cause and consequence. This way, narrating a fire is similar to narrating a war for they keep a similar structure. There is a chain of statements which are causally connected to one of them and their truth depends on the truth of this very causal statement. According to philosophers since Hume, this causal statement is an instance of a general rule, which should be called covering law.
BETWEEN 1623 and 1797 the political decline of Rome and Venice, the two most vital centres of Italian Baroque art, was almost continuous. In both cities, architects, sculptors and painters of the first rank were employed by those in authority - in Rome the constantly changing upholders of a theocratic absolutism, in Venice the old and new families that composed a rigid oligarchic aristocracy - to impress themselves and foreigners alike with illusions of power which had little basis in reality. The achievements of Bernini, Pietro da Cortona and Tiepolo are there to prove with what conviction and genius great artists can serve great patrons however unpromising the cause. Nor can it be denied (though many have tried to do so) that these achievements, and others of a similar nature represent the finest Italian contribution to the art of the period; and the significance of this is brought to light if we compare the situation with that of foreign artists. There are no Italian equivalents to Velasquez, Rembrandt, Vermeer, Louis Le Nain, Georges de la Tour, Poussin, Watteau of Chardin - all painters who expressed a private and individual outlook that is far removed from the 'public' masterpieces of the greatest Italians.

This may be due only to the fortuitous distribution of talent, but there are so many cases in Italian art during these two centuries where a fresh and original approach to life becomes buried under the pressing claims of society that the temptation to seek and answer other than the last resort of 'national character' becomes irresistible. One think of the bamboccianti who hover for a few years on the brink of a new dignified 'realism', only to fal into picturesque sentimentality; of Salvador Rosa, so bold to exploit his gifted temperament in the cause of artistic conformity; of Crespi, just able to carry 'humour' and raise genre painting to a more noble status; of Canaletto, who turned so soon from gazing with steady penetration at the backwaters of his native city to stereotyping shorthand versions of the familiar views to tourists; of Padre Lodoli, the 'scourge of society', who was yet honoured with an official government post and whose explosive writings were never even published.

Modern Italian historians have noted, and bitterly resented, the same kind of conformity in the writers of the time. Until detailed investigation has been made of the contrasting conditions elsewhere it will be difficult not to account for it, but such an investigation is not likely to reflect harshly on the Italian patrons. Where else in Europe can we find men more cultivated and more liberal? Was Philip IV more tolerant and better educated than Urban VIII and his nephews? Richelieu than Cassiano dal Pozzo? the Régent, Crozat or Mme Geoffrin than Grand Prince Ferdinand or Francesco Algarotti?

It is perhaps precisely in the broad culture and tolerance of Italian patrons that the answer should be sought. Like 'advanced' parents of the most humane
opinions, who apply no direct pressure to children, yet whose views are all too parasingly communicated to them, the aristocracy, traditional and upstart, of Baroque Italy, may have stifled revolt through the very self-assurance of their inherited values. None of the artists mentioned above was deflected from his path by specific pressures; at no period in Italy did an orthodox Academy or a dominating religious organisation impose its artistic doctrines. Unorthodoxy was killed with kindness.

Such an attitude has its advantages as well as its drawbacks, if it is true that we miss a certain type of individual and withdrawn artist in Italy (Domenico Fetti is surely the most beautiful exception), it is also true that the general level of painting in Rome, Bologna, Naples and Venice - to name a few of the most important centres - was certainly higher than in almost any other town in Europe. The opportunities and encouragement given to architects, painters and sculptors have rarely, if ever, been equalled, and the debt of gratitude we owe to the liberal patrons of the time can be seen not only in Italy but in every art gallery of the world.

Yet the price to be paid was a high one. Artists so closely tied to the patronage of a particular society could not adapt themselves to new conditions when foundations of that society collapsed. The 'bourgeois' painting of England and France had no real roots in Italy, and the attempts made by bodies such as the Academy at Parma to promote a more modern and 'enlightened' type of art met with little success. Whereas in France and England apinting took on a new and more glorious lease of life with the decline of the Church and the feudal aristocracy, the fall of Venice signified no less than the humiliating expiry of Italian art.


**Questão 6 - 2,0 pontos**

In the next two questions, decide if the statements are true or false.

There was persistence of traditional values and structures in the Italian art of the period as some sort of reply to aristocracy's projections of power, a response to the political decline of those elites.

a) True  
   b) False

**Questão 7 - 2,0 pontos**

Patronage funding allowed Italian painting to remain technically superior to that from other European centers during the period at study.

a) True  
   b) False

**Questão 8 - 2,0 pontos**

In the passage "Like 'advanced' parents of the most humane opinions, who apply no direct pressure to children, yet whose views are all too parasingly communicated to them, the aristocracy, traditional and upstart, of Baroque Italy, may have stifled revolt through the very assurance of their inherited values." (4th paragraph), the expression 'may have stifled revolt' could be replaced, without change in the meaning, with:

- (a) has probably suffocated revolt
- (b) might have strangled revolt
- (c) should have smothered revolt
- (d) may have revived revolt
- (e) has certainly dispatched revolt

**Questão 9 - 2,0 pontos**

In the passage "If it is true that we miss a certain type of individual and withdrawn artist in Italy..." (5th paragraph), the word 'withdrawn' could be replaced, without change in the meaning, with:

- (a) extroverted
- (b) immodest
- (c) outgoing
- (d) bashful
- (e) extravagant
<table>
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<th>Questão 10 - 2,0 pontos</th>
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<td>The passage &quot;The 'bourgeois' painting of England and France had no real roots in Italy, and the attempts made by bodies such as the Academy at Parma to promote a more modern and 'enlightened' type of art met with little success.&quot; (6th paragraph), is suitably rewritten, without any change in meaning, in alternative:</td>
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<td>a) The bourgeois painting of England and France had no successful influence in Italy, where there were attempts to develop a more contemporary art on the grounds of Enlightenment.</td>
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<td>b) The bourgeois painting of England and France owe little to Italian art, where bodies such as the Academy at Parma did not succeed in promoting a more modern kind of art.</td>
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<td>c) Bodies such the Academy at Parma attempted to promote a more modern and enlightened art in Italy with a little success, that had no real influence in the bourgeois painting of England and France.</td>
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<td>d) English and French bourgeois painting had no real inception in Italy, though the attempts of bodies such as the Academy at Parma had little success in promoting it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) English and French bourgeois painting had no real inception in Italy, and the attempts to promote a more modern and enlightened art had a little success.</td>
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He who gives himself entirely to his fellow-men appears to them useless and selfish; but he who gives himself partially to them is pronounced a benefactor and philanthropist.

How does it become a man to behave toward this American government today? I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it. I cannot for an instant recognize that political organization as my government which is the slave's government also.

All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist, the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But almost all say that such is not the case now. But such was the case, they think, in the Revolution of '75. If one were to tell me that his was a bad government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probable that I should not make an ado about it, for I can do without them. All machines have their friction; and possibly this does enough good to counterbalance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, I think it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty more urgent is the fact that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army.

Paley, a common authority with many on moral questions, in his chapter on the "Duty of Submission to Civil Government", resolves all civil obligation into expediency; and proceeds to say, "that so long as the interest of the whole society requires it, that is so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconveniency, it is the will of God that the established government be obeyed, and no longer...This principle is admitted, the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of the probability and expense of redressing it on the other." Of this, he says, every man shall judge for himself. But Paley appears never to have contemplated those cases to which the rule of expediency does not apply, in which a people, as well as an individual, must do justice, cost what it may. If I have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must restore it to him though I drown myself. This, according to Paley, would be inconvenient. But the that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose it. This people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, though it cost them their existence as people.

In their practice, nations agree with Paley; but does any one think that Massachusetts does exactly what is right at the present crisis?
Unjust laws exist: shall we be content to obey them, or shall we endeavor to amend them, and obey them until we have succeeded, or shall we transgress them at once? Men generally, under such a government as this, think that they ought to wait until they have persuaded the majority to alter them. They think that, if they should resist, the remedy would be worse than the evil. But it is the fault of the government itself that the remedy is worse than the evil. It makes it worse. Why is it not more apt to anticipate and provide for reform? Why does it not cherish its wise minority? Why does it cry and resist before it is hurt? Why does it not encourage its citizens to be on the alert to point out its faults, and do better than it would have them? Why does it always crucify Christ, and excommunicate Copernicus and Luther, and pronounce Washington and Franklin rebels?

On would think, that a deliberate and practical denial of its authority was the only offence never contemplated by government; else, why has it not assigned its definite, its suitable and proportionate penalty? If a man who has no property refuses but once to earn nine shillings ofr the State, he is put in prison for a period unlimited by any law that I know, and determined only by the discretion of those who placed him there; but if he should steal ninety times nine shillings from the State, he is soon permitted to go at large again.

If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of the machine of government, let it go, let it go: perchance it will wear smooth, certainly the machine will wear out. If the injustice has a spring, or a pully, or a rope, or a crank, exclusively for itself, then perhaps you may consider whether the remedy will not be worse than the evil; but if it is of such a nature that it requires you to be the agent of injustice to another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine. What I have to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself to the wrong which I condemn.

As for adopting the ways which the State has provided for remedying the evil, I know not of such ways. They take too much time, and a man's life will be gone. I have other affairs to attend to. I came into this world, not chiefly to make this a good place to live in, but to live in it, be it good or bad. A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not necessary that he should do something wrong. It is not my business to be petitioning the Governor of the Legislature any more that it is theirs to petition me; and, if they should not hear my petition, what should I do then? But in this case the State has provided no way: its very Constitution is the evil. This may seem to be harsh and stubborn and unconciliatory; but it is to treat with the utmost kindness and consideration the only spirit that can appreciate or deserves it. So is all change for better, like birth and death, which convulse the body.
**Questão 13 - 2,0 pontos**
Choose the alternative with a correct inference made from the 3rd paragraph.

- a) The author argues that citizens should not mind if injustice is part of the necessary friction to the machine of government.
- b) If injustice is necessary to keep government working, the remedy to it would be worse then the evil it causes.
- c) No one should accept to be an agent of injustice even if laws force you to do it.
- d) Laws should exist to make government work regardless of what individuals condemn.
- e) If we let the injustice persist as a necessary friction to the machine of government, chances are the machine will resist.

**Questão 14 - 2,0 pontos**
The passage "A man has not everything to do, but something; and because he cannot do everything, it is not necessary that he should do something wrong." is correctly rephrased in:

- a) A man has not anything to do, just something; he cannot do everything; so he should not do anything wrong.
- b) Because a man cannot do anything, it is not necessary that he should do something wrong while he has something to do.
- c) A man has anything to do, but nothing; and because he can do nothing, it is necessary that he should do anything wrong.
- d) A man should not do anything wrong just because he cannot do everything; he has anything to do instead.
- e) A man has just something to do, not everything, for he can't; thus, he should not necessarily do something wrong.

**Questão 15 - 2,0 pontos**
In the passage "So is all change for better, like birth and death, which convulse the body."
the word 'convulse' could be properly replaced with:

- a) harm
- b) change
- c) agitate
- d) fix
- e) settle